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FED. INS. v. LAKE SHORE (Cont.) 
the outer limits" of due process, Triplett v. R.M. Wade& Co., 261 
S.C. 419 (1973)) had to be applied to determine whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction met the requirements of due 
process. The Court noted that, "the constitutional touchstone 
remains whether the defendant purposefully established 
'minimum contacts' in the forum," Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 467, 474 (1985) "such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.' " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945) quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
Under the facts, the Court found that the defendant's contact 
with the forum state did not suggest a purposefulness, and thus 
personal jurisdiction could not be asserted without offending 
notions of due process. 
The court also rejected Federal's argument that defendants 
were subject to South Carolina's personal jurisdiction under a 
stream of commerce theory. Citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 ( 1986), the Court noted that factors 
such as marketing and advertising by defendants in the forum 
state which might make a stream of commerce theory applicable 
were lacking. Moreover, in this case, defendants' products were 
transported into the forum by a consumer. To allow the state to 
use this as a means of exercising personal jurisdiction over 
defendants would effectively mean that, "amenability to suit 
would travel with the chattel." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980). Also, this case did not 
involve multiple deliveries of units into South Carolina over a 
period of years. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122. Though the court did not 
reject out of hand a stream of commerce theory, such a theory 
clearly did not apply in this case. 
Finally, the court rejected Federal's assertion that the nature 
of an ocean-going vessel (designed and manufactured) to go 
from port to port is such that it sustains the exercise of personal 
juridsiction. Recognizing that the Supreme Court had already 
rejected such an argument in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 
at 296 n.11, the court added that all products are mobile to some 
extent and a product-by-product approach tb personal jurisdiction 
would succeed only in drawing courts into an arcane and litigi­
ous search for meaningless distinctions. Thus, the question to 
ask in assessing whether personal jurisdiction can properly be 
asserted is not as to the nature of the product, but the nature of 
the defendants' contacts with the forum state. 
Upon these findings, the Court held that it would not be 
reasonable for personal jurisdiction to be asserted over defendants, 
that this was sufficient independent grounds for dismissal. In 
support of this conclusion, the court noted certain factors that 
should be considered in determining whether the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction offends due process requirements. The 
court included among the factors; the defendant's burden in 
litigating in the forum, the forum state's interest, the plaintiffs 
interest in obtaining relief in the forum, the interstate judicial 
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies and the shared interest of the several states in 
furthering fundamental social policies. In this case, the court 
found that the defendant's contacts with the state of South 
Carolina are insufficient to warrant the proper assertion of 
personal jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, the court affirmed 
the district court judgment granting defendants' motion to dis­
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Alex Barnett '9 1 
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. v. L & L MARINE SERVICE INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Eight Circuit, 6 July 1989 
87 5 F.2d 1351 
Negligence by the operators of a vessel does not act to supervene the owners absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel 
for the voyage intended. All the resulting damages will be allocated by the comparative degree of fault of the parties. The 
work by a tug of pulling the vessel off a shoal is properly classified as towage rather than salvage. 
FACTS: The barge Apex Chicago and the tug Maya went aground 
off the coast of Massachusetts on October 19, 1981, while en­
route from Carteret, New Jersey to Boston, Massachusetts. The 
crew of the tug were employees of L & L Marine Service (L&LJ, 
which operated the barge and tug under an agreement with 
Apex Towing (Apex). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) had issued small craft advisories along 
the route and upgraded them to gale warnings by 6:00 PM on 
October 18th. Instead of heeding the warnings, the Maya left 
the protected waters of Long Island Sound and proceeded into 
the open waters of Block Island Sound and Rhode Island Sound. 
While in Rhode Island Sound early on the morning of October 
19th, severe weather was encountered, consisting of winds up to 
35 knots, squalls, zero visibility and ten foot seas. During this 
rough leg of the voyage, the towing cable parted. Due to the 
intensity of the storm, the crew did not realize that the barge 
had come adrift for thirty minutes. Expert testimony showed 
that the breaking strength of the tow cable was significantly 
lower than that required by industry standards. This problem 
was exacerbated by the fact that the crew could not let out more 
cable to reduce the stress. The cable could not be slacked, because 
the winch had an antiquated manual release mechanism that 
was dangerous to operate in rough weather. By the tme the crew 
of the Maya sighted the barge Apex Chicago, she was aground 
on the Hen and Chicken Shoals, leaking gasoline through a 
gash in her hull. While attempting to pull the barge from the 
rocks, the tug further damaged the barge before going aground. 
The stranded tug and barge were freed when aU .S. Coast Guard 
vessel and two private tugs, the Chicopee and the Jaguar, arrived. 
The Jaguar pulled the Maya free with a floating hawser that 
had been connected by Coast Guard personnel; the Maya pulled 
the Apex Chicago free, and then the Jaguar and the Chicopee 
towed the two vessels to port where the cargo was lightered. In 
the aftermath of the accident, American Home Assurance Co. 
(American) paid several sizable claims to, or on behalf of, Apex 
Oil Company (Apex Oil). These claims included one by the 
Jaguar for "salavage" of the Maya. As a subrogee of Apex Oil, 
American brought an action against L&L to recover the damages 
resulting from the accident, which American alleges were prox­
imately caused by the negligent operation of the Maya by L&L's 
crew. The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri, awarded judgment to American for one half of the 
sum of provable damages based on the comparative degree of 
fault of the parties. American appealed the decision. 
ISSUES: 1) Is the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel qualified 
by an assumption that the crew will navigate the vessel out of 
harm's way? 
2) Was the allocation of damages according to the 
comparative degree of fault proper? 
3) Was the Jaguar's pulling of the Maya off the 
shoals properly classified as "salvage" or "towage"? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Eight Circuit, affirm­
ing in part and vacating in part, held that the duty of the owner 
to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute. This absolute duty is 
not qualified by an assumption that the crew will navigate the 
vessel out of harm's way and is defined by the vessel's intended 
voyage, the hazards likely to be encountered and the vessel'·s 
ability to withstand these hazards. The measure of a vessel's 
seaworthiness is not a function of her crew's skill and foresight 
in navigation. The behavior of L&L's crew was negligent, but 
the substantially understrength cable and obsolete stern winch 
(continues .. .) 
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contributed equally to the accident and the weather encountered 
was not so unusual as to be unforeseeable. 
The resulting damages were properly allocated among the 
parties proportionally according to the comparative degree of 
their fault. L&L had neither a vessel interest nor a cargo interest 
and could not be considered a contributing participant in a 
common nautical venture. L&L was sued merely as a tortfeasor 
and the concept of general-average adjustment, as used by the 
other parties to adjust the damages among themselves, does not 
apply. While the district court's allocation of damages was 
proper, it did not include the costs of hull repair and cargo 
lightering. For this reason the damage award is vacated and 
remanded for reconsideration. . 
The work done by the tug Jaguar was properly classified as 
towage. It was the Cost Guard vessel on the scene that actually 
performed the crucial act of rescue by attaching the floating 
hawser to the Maya, and the Jaguar then merely pulled the 
Maya off the Shoal. The finding of the district court that this 
work would properly be classified as towage rather than salvage 
was affirmed. 
Stephen W. Beyer '92 
CALIFORNIA HOME BRANDS, INC. v. FERREIRA 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 28 March 1989 
871 F.2d830 
Shipowner cannot sue seaman, whose negligence allegedly caused injury to co-seaman, for indemnification or contribution 
based upon shipowner's Jones Act liability to said co-seaman. 
FACTS: In January 1985, Manuel Rebelo, a crewmember of 
the M/V Pan Pacific, sustained personal injuries on board the 
vessel. Rebelo filed a claim for maintenance and cure. In re­
sponse to Rebelo's claim, the shipowners, California Home 
Brands Inc. (CHB), commenced an action for declaratory relief, 
denying responsibility for maintenance and cure. Rebelo 
counterclaimed for negligence under the Jones Act, unsea­
worthiness, and maintence and cure. 
CHB commenced a separate action against Danny Ferreira, 
a co-seaman, for contribution and/or indemnification, claiming 
Ferreira's puported negligence contributed to Rebelo's injuries. 
Ferreira, moved to dismiss CHB's complaint and after a hearing, 
the trial court held that CHB's suit against its own employee for 
indemnity and contribution was barred as a matter of law. 
ISSUE: Is a shipowner-employer who may be liable to an 
injured seaman-employee under the Jones Act entitled to such 
indemnity and contribution from a co-seaman whose negligence 
allegedly caused the injury? 
ANALYSIS: In its affirmation of the district court's decision, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered judgement for 
Ferreira despite numerous arguments by CHB for indemnification 
and contribution. 
The Court explicitly declined to recognize conventional land­
based tort liability theories regarding indemnity or contribution 
from fellow employees, continuing to be guided by rules specifically 
developed in the context of maritime employment. 
Traditional maritime law recognized only two claims by a 
seaman injured in the course of employment - a seaman injured 
while on board a vessel was entitled to "maintenance and cure" 
(which included wages until the end of the voyage), and recovery 
of damages for injuries sustained due to the unseaworthiness of 
the ship The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). A vessel owner's duty 
to provide such "maintenance and cure" is implied as part of the 
employment contract, and this duty is not subject to abrogation 
by the parties. Similarly, the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy 
ship is absolute; once a seaman proved that his injuries were 
caused by the unseaworthy condition of the vessel or its equipment, 
the shipowner was liable regardless of fault. Carlisle Packing 
Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1912). The common law concept 
of negligence as a basis for tort liability was not extended to 
employment injuries at sea until passage of the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C. §688 (1920), which created a negligence right of action 
for seamen against their employers. CHB argued that if Congress 
had intended to protect seamen from personal liability, the 
Jones Act would have included an express immunizing provision. 
The Court refused to accept this rationale, stating that the 
purpose of the Act was to benefit and protect seamen by enlarging 
the remedies available to them. The Court concluded that to 
interpret the statute to allow lawsuits against seamen would 
frustrate the beneficial purpose of the Act. 
CHB attempted to further advance its cause of action against 
Ferreira under principles of maritime indemnity and contribution 
established under two prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See 
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp., 342 
U.S. 482 (1952) andCooperStevedoringCorp. Inc. v.FritzKople 
Inc., 417 U.S. 106 ( 1974). In Halcyon, a shipowner was sued by a 
longshoreman for injuries sustained on board a vessel. The 
shipowner sought to implead the longshoreman's employer, 
who was otherwise exempted by statute, as a third party de­
fendant. The Supreme Court held that no right of contribution 
existed in such non-collision maritime cases. In Cooper, an 
injured longshoreman sued the vessel owner, who later imp­
leaded the non employer, stevedoring company as a third party 
defendant. The Supreme Court held that the vessel owner was 
entitled to implead such stevedoring company as a joint tort­
feasor. CHB's attempt to wed these holdings to the facts of the 
case at bar was held to be too sweeping. The Court indicated that 
unless a direct cause of action exists by one seaman against 
another for shipboard injuries, the employer can have no right of 
indemnification or contribution from the employee. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's hold­
ing that before any statutory rights were created, a seaman 
could not sue his co-employee for negligence. The Court in 
interpreting the Jones Act concluded that Ferreira could not be 
directly liable to Rebelo and therefore, no basis existed for 
CHB's claim for indemnity against Ferreira. See, CHB. Foods, 
Inc. v. Rebelo, 662 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.CAL.1987). 
CHB also argued that it had a right to indemnity from Fer­
reira on an implied contractual basis, citing the "primary duty 
rule" adopted in Reinhart u. United States, 475 F.2d 151 (9th 
Cir. 1972). (Seaman-employee may not recover from his employer 
for injuries caused by his own failure to perform a duty imposed 
on him by his employment.) The Court held that Reinhart had 
no application in this case because the primary duty rule works 
only to bar a plaintiffs suit for damages when his injury resulted 
from his own breach. It does not create any rights against third 
parties. Given the conditions of maritime employment, the imp­
lication of a covenant of workmanlike performance running 
from the seaman to his employer and entitling the latter to 
indemnity is not a reasonable one. SeeFlunker v. United States, 
528 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Finally, the policy arguments advanced by CHB for indemnity 
and contribution were rejected by the Court as not in keeping 
with the history and purpose of the Jones Act. The Court cone­
! uded that to subject a seaman to the costs of defending a lawsuit 
by his employer and the threat of ultimate liability would place 
an intolerable burden on what is already considered a difficult 
occupation. See Socony-Vacume Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 
(1939). 
Alfonso C. Pistone '91 
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